

Consciousness and applied linguistics theory and practice**Rustamov Elmirza***Mater's student of NamSU***Article history:***Received: 25th February., 2022**Accepted: 27th February., 2022**Published: 28th February., 2022*

Abstract: *The paper reviews the previous empirical studies on the important role of consciousness in second language acquisition (SLA) through stating the views of different authors, philosophers, scholars. Then, the role of consciousness in terms of concepts such as attention, awareness, intentionality, and control comes up for review. These concepts provide growing support for the view that the role of consciousness is vital for second language learning.*

Key words: **consciousness, acquisition, role, attention, awareness, intentionality, control**

Consciousness is a core issue in the field of second language acquisition. The role of consciousness in SLA is of considerable importance and should be specifically considered if we are to make progress in understanding how this acquisition takes place. SLA researchers interested in consciousness should start by considering what others have to say about it. This is necessary to develop a comprehensive picture of consciousness. The debate in SLA needs to be informed by an adequate notion of what consciousness is. Only in this way can we reach an adequate view about its role. The researchers present a review of the research findings on the role of consciousness in SLA.

The other view of consciousness is related to Csikszentmihalyi's view (1990) on the notion of flow. He states that consciousness, while is self - directed, has developed the ability to override its genetic instructions and to set its own independent course of action. He describes function of consciousness as follows: The function of consciousness is to represent information about what is happening outside and inside the organism in such a way that it can be evaluated and acted upon by the body. It functions as a clearinghouse for sensations, perceptions, feelings, and ideas, establishing priorities among all the diverse information. Without consciousness, we would still know what is going on, but we would have to react to it in a reflexive, instinctive way. With consciousness, we can weigh what the sense tells us, and respond accordingly. We can also invent information that did not exist before: it is because we have consciousness that we can daydream, make up lies, and write beautiful poems and scientific theories (1990, p.24). Therefore, it means the organizing, controlling, and evaluating of experience. We might be able to respond to the environment without consciousness, but it would be more like the leaf of a plant which moves in the direction of the sunlight. Clearly, the bulk of human learning can only be accomplished by a consciously acting person. The last view of consciousness deals with its relationship with language. Vygotsky says that to become conscious of a mental operation means to transfer it from the plane of action to that of language, i.e., to recreate it in the imagination so that it can be expressed in words (1962, p.88). Without language and without

social interaction, consciousness could exist at all. This means that both consciousness and language are inextricably connected like two sides of a coin. It can be stated that the growth of language means the growth of consciousness as well and that learning equals the acquisition of consciousness. Schmidt (1990; 1995; 2001) has frequently stated that conscious awareness of the target language system is necessary if learners are to produce correct forms and use them appropriately. Schmidt (2001:26) has told that second language acquisition is driven by what learners pay consciously attention to and notice in the target language input and what they understand the significance of the noticed input to be. Leow (1997) viewed that meta – awareness appeared to correlate with an increased usage of hypothesis testing and morphological rule formation, whereas absence of meta – awareness appeared to correlate with an absence of such process and that learners of high level of awareness performed significantly better

Researchers recommended the use of grammatical consciousness – raising exercises to foster explicit knowledge, to be used as a complement to a functional or task – based syllabus intended to promote implicit knowledge. He added that explicit declarative knowledge cannot directly become implicit procedural knowledge but can foster its development through intake facilitation, causing learners to pay consciously attention to formal features of the input and to notice the gap between these features and those of their inter language expressed that whereas both awareness at the levels of noticing and understanding contributed substantially to a significant increase of learners ability to recognize the targeted structure, awareness at the level of understanding also had a differential effect on the amount of intake when compared to awareness at the level of noticing. The Noticing Hypothesis of Schmidt claims that conscious awareness of grammar plays an important role in the process of second language acquisition. It says that noticing is a necessary condition for learning. The Noticing Hypothesis requires conscious awareness of grammatical details rather than simply global awareness of input. It is also associated with the influential notion of consciousness raising.

According to some researchers, L2 development is largely an unconscious process. Krashen does allow that there are two processes involved in L2 development, a conscious process of learning and an unconscious process of acquisition. The conscious process of learning is a system based on rules and their application, while the unconscious process of acquisition is a system responsible for language production. According to Krashen, conscious learning is limited to a small set of simple rule-governed domains. By contrast, development of the much more substantial acquired system is fostered by avoiding instruction and the provision of L2 rules. In his view, learners only have to be exposed to comprehensible language input in order to acquire grammar. On the other side, there are researchers who argue that comprehensible input alone is not enough for optimal acquisition of the different aspects of grammar and that conscious grammatical instruction is necessary if learners are to have the data they need to acquire grammar. In particular, Schmidt (1994) argues that consciousness of input at the level of noticing is a necessary condition for L2 development. Many other researchers support this view. In one way or another, all of these terms are about directing learners' attention to grammatical form in order to help them internalize the L2 system. According to these researchers, teaching should include opportunities for learners to focus on form and consciously notice features of the L2 they are learning.

All in all, some level of consciousness is necessary for second language acquisition. The review presented in this paper on consciousness has certainly important implications in SLA. Consciousness provides an opportunity to unite useful concepts from cognitive psychology in SLA.

Research on the general nature of learning including work on its relations to consciousness, forms an important source of information and ideas, a source the SLA theory cannot afford to ignore. Throughout the discussion, we stated that conscious awareness of language is a necessary condition for its acquisition. We reviewed the four concepts of consciousness: (a) consciousness as attention. It claims that learning without some form of attention is not possible; (b) consciousness as awareness. It says that conscious awareness of language is necessary if learners want to use it appropriately; (c) consciousness as intentionality. It deals with the distinction between intentional and incidental L2 learning; and (d) consciousness as control. It says that automatic, fluent output processing should not be under full conscious control. And finally, it is concluded that consciousness and language are inextricably interconnected; the development of one goes in hand with the development of the other.

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