

**PRICING. LIMITED INCOME LINES. ELASTICITY BY INCOME**

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**Abstract:** *Pricing in this article. Limited income lines. Opinions on elasticity in terms of income are given.*

**Keywords:** *price, monopoly income, equilibrium, mathematical model, supply line, efficiency.*

A monopolist who conducts price discrimination. Such a market would be a monopoly market if the owner of the apartments in the market was a single person or if several homeowners in the market act together as a single landlord.

A monopolist landlord can sell apartments to tenants who pay the highest price in a row on an auction basis. This means that different tenants pay different prices for apartments, a situation that is called monopolist, which uses price discrimination.

To simplify, let's assume that each of the monopolistic tenants who applies price discrimination knows the reserve price for buying an apartment.


This means that the monopolist gives the first apartment to the tenant who pays the highest price, in our case \$ 500. It gives the next apartment for \$ 490 and so on. Each apartment is given to the highest price payer. The final tenant pays an  $R^*$  price for the apartment. The peculiarity of the monopolist, who uses price discrimination, is that in a competitive market situation, whoever rents the apartment, in this case, they also rent the apartment. This means that in a monopolistic situation where price discrimination, tenants pay a different price for an apartment, in a competitive market these tenants rent an apartment at the same equilibrium price  $R^*$ . We will see the reason for this later.

The monopolist raises the price by reducing the number of apartments it leases, resulting in a monopoly income. Suppose the demand for an apartment  $R$  price is  $D(P)$ . If a monopolist rents an apartment at an  $R$  price, he earns  $R \cdot D(P)$ . This length of income is equal to the price  $R$ , the width of which is equal to the area of the rectangle equal to the number of apartments  $D(P)$ .

The monopolist gets the maximum benefit by setting a price higher than the competitive market price  $R^*$ .

In a monopoly, fewer apartments are rented than in a competitive market, and the price is also higher.

**Figure 1. The monopolist's income is equal to the face of the rectangle.**



If control over the rental price is established. Suppose the city government set the rental price below the equilibrium price  $R^*$ . In this case, the demand exceeds the supply. It's hard to say anything about who will get the apartments. If the rent is controlled, people who buy apartments in a competitive market will get some, and those who live in the outer circle will get some.

Which method of allocating apartments is better

We have considered four ways to distribute apartments:

- Competitive market;
- A monopolist who supports price discrimination;
- Ordinary monopolist;
- Rental price control.

In each of the four methods we have considered, the apartments are given to different people and the rent is set at a different price. Which one is better, the Institute of Apartment Distribution? By what criteria can the best be determined by comparison?

It is also possible to assess the distribution based on the economic status of the participants. Clearly, homeowners who use price discrimination can make a lot of money. This method brings maximum income to homeowners. With this in mind, it can be concluded that the method of

controlling the rental price is the most negative method. When it comes to tenants, the average welfare in a monopoly that supports price discrimination is lower than other methods because most of the tenants pay more than other distribution methods. When rents are controlled - the well-being of tenants who receive an apartment increases relative to the competitive market, but those who do not receive an apartment are lower than in a competitive market.

Given the well-being of landlords and tenants, which of the distribution methods we have considered is good, how, and by what criteria can it be assessed?

#### Pareto efficiency

In our case, the method of allocating apartments is called effective according to Pareto, if there is no other alternative method that leads to a decrease in the welfare of each of the executors and an increase in the welfare of some of them. In other words, if we find such a distribution method that does not decrease the welfare of the others by increasing the welfare of at least one of them, here we see an inefficient distribution method according to Pareto, if one leads to a decrease in welfare, we call the distribution effective according to Pareto. This means that no one is interested in changing their position in an effective distribution according to Pareto. When someone increases their well-being, the well-being of another person decreases, which he does not allow.

Now let's look at our model in terms of Pareto efficiency. Suppose the apartments are randomly distributed. In this case, someone wanted to take an apartment from the inner circle, but he settled in the outer circle, and the tenant who wanted to take from the outer circle was given the apartment from the inner circle. Suppose you are allowed to exchange apartments. It is known that there are those who want to change their apartment at the expense of adequate compensation.

For example, individual A took an apartment from the inner circle and he valued the apartment at \$ 200. Individual V from the outer circle is willing to buy a house in the inner circle for \$ 300. By paying some compensation to individual A, they can exchange apartments, where the exact amount does not matter. In this case, the welfare of both A and B increased. The important thing is that whoever pays a lot for an apartment, he gets this apartment, because there are people who live in the inner circle, underestimate the apartment and want to replace it with a certain compensation.

Suppose all free exchanges are over. As a result, the redistribution of apartments in this process will be effective on Pareto. Otherwise, there would be an exchange between the tenants and increase the welfare of both parties, without reducing the others, but this contradicts the idea that the free exchanges we mentioned earlier are over. Hence, the distribution of subsequent flats after the end of free exchanges is effective across Pareto.

#### Evaluation of the method of distribution of apartments

Ultimately the question arises, who will get the apartments after all the beneficial exchanges are over?

Before answering the question, it should be noted that the reserve price of those living in the inner circle (the maximum possible price for an apartment) should be higher than that of those living in the outer circle, otherwise they would have to exchange apartments, which would increase their well-being. This means that if apartment S was rented in the total inner circle, the S person with the highest reserve price would get that apartment. Such a distribution is considered effective on Pareto, while others are not effective on Pareto. In any other distribution, there would be reciprocity between

people, and in doing so both sides would have increased the welfare of the people, without diminishing the others.

The Pareto efficiency criterion is applied to the other distribution methods we have considered. Let's start with a competitive market. It can be seen that when distributed through the market mechanism, tenants with  $S$  have an apartment with a higher reserve price, i.e., tenants who pay a price higher than the equilibrium price  $R^*$ . Thus, when apartments are rented in a competitive market, there is no room for mutually beneficial exchanges. Distribution through a competitive market will be effective across Pareto as a result.

Even in a monopoly that supports price discrimination, the distribution is effective according to Pareto, as here the apartments are distributed sequentially to the tenants who pay the highest price. In this case, both in the competitive market, the apartments are leased for the same. In both markets, payers above the  $R^*$  price get an apartment from the inner circle, and the distribution is efficient across Pareto, in the sense that there is no need for useful exchanges here either, but income is distributed differently. Clearly, in a monopoly that uses price discrimination, consumer welfare is much lower than in a competitive market.

In general, Pareto efficiency does not say anything about the success achieved through substitution, it only means the effect of substitution, i.e., that all the substitutions that lead to success have taken place completely. If in the distribution it is possible to increase the well-being of one person without reducing the well-being of another, this is called Pareto improvement.

The distribution of apartments in the ordinary monopolist is not efficient according to Pareto. Because the monopolist sells the apartment at a high price by reducing the supply of apartments. The apartments are not sold in full. Therefore, he can benefit from buying an apartment at any price for a person who has no apartment. The welfare of former tenants will not decrease as the previous price has not changed. So here it is possible to improve on the Pareto, i.e. both the monopolist and the next tenant increase their welfare without diminishing the others.

Lastly, the distribution by rental price control is also inefficient under Pareto. This is because here, too, beneficial reciprocal exchanges take place after the apartments are distributed.

If the apartment from the inner circle falls to the person who evaluates the apartment inside the circle from the outer circle, the opportunity to replace it remains.

Example: Apartment demand function

$$D(P)=100-2P$$

If the monopolist had 60 apartments, how much would he rent and how many apartments. If there are 40 apartments, how many apartments will he rent?

In the previous first topic, we talked about two fundamental principles of microeconomic analysis: the principle of optimization and the principle of equilibrium. So far, we have seen the application of the principle of optimization: we have considered the issues of consumers choosing the optimal consumer complex and maximizing the profits of firms. Now we learn that a state of equilibrium is created by combining the movement of consumers with the movement of firms. To do this, we start by studying the market offer.

The supply line shows how many goods a manufacturer can produce in the market at each price, i.e., according to the supply definition, how many  $S(P)$  goods are put on the market at each price level  $R$ . The analysis here is based on the existence of a functional relationship between price and the quantity of goods or supply that consumers purchase.

Suppose there are a number of consumers. If their individual demand lines are given, it is possible to collect them and obtain a market demand line. Similarly, if there are unrelated, sellers who put the same product on the market, it is possible to get their offer line from the aggregator.

Here, individual buyers and sellers accept the market price as it is given and cannot control the market price.

Such a market is called a competitive market if the price in the market cannot be controlled by every economic entity.

In a competitive market, although the market price does not depend on the movement of a single market entity, they together determine the market price. The equilibrium price of a commodity is the price at which the supply of the commodity is equal to the demand for it. From a geometric point of view, the equilibrium price intersects the supply line with the demand line, and the intersecting equilibrium point represents the market equilibrium.

If we denote the market demand line by  $D(P)$  and the market supply line by  $S(P)$ , then the equilibrium value  $R^*$  is the solution of the following equation.

At equilibrium price, market demand is equal to market supply. Why is  $R^*$  the equilibrium price? Because at this price, all individuals choose the quantity that is most convenient for them, and at the same time, the equilibrium price satisfies both buyers and sellers. If the price differs from the equilibrium price, the action of the same individuals remains unfulfilled and there is a tendency to change their movement.

At the point where the supply line intersects the demand line, the choice of market participants is optimal and their behavior is consistent. The above two conditions are not met if the equilibrium price is  $R^*$  other price. When the market balance is disturbed, the market has the ability to automatically restore its equilibrium state. For example, if  $R' < R^*$  is smaller than the market price, then  $R' < R^*$  will increase competition among buyers for the goods, with sellers responding by raising the price. This process continues until the price  $R'$  is equal to the market price  $R^*$ .

Similarly, if  $R' > R^*$ , demand is smaller than supply, the seller will not be able to sell part of the goods. They lower the price to sell the commodity, resulting in increased demand, and this process continues until the  $R'$  price is equal to the market price  $R^*$ .

There are two specific situations in which market equilibrium is established, and they are encountered in life.

The first condition is that the offer will not change. The quantity of goods offered here is predetermined and it does not depend on the price. The constant supply line is in a vertical view. Figure 16.1.


In this case, the equilibrium commodity quantity is determined only by the supply condition and the equilibrium price is determined only by the demand condition.

The second case is that the offer line is perfectly horizontal. If the supply line of the network is horizontal, then the network puts any quantity of goods on the market at a constant price.

In this case, the equilibrium price is determined by the supply condition, the equilibrium quantity - through the demand line.

**A - vertical supply line,**

**B - horizontal supply line**



Demand and supply functions can be written as inverse demand and supply functions.

$P_S(Q)$  – reverse bidding function, where the bid amount is the price function. Indicates at what price, how much goods will be offered.

$P_D(Q)$  – the inverse demand function, the demand quantity will be the price function. In the inverse demand function, it indicates at what price and how much goods are required.

Here, the equilibrium price is the price of the quantity of goods sold, equal to the price of the quantity of goods purchased:

$$P_S(Q) = P_D(Q)$$

For example. Market equilibrium when there is linear demand and linear supply.

Given the linear demand and supply function:

$$D(P) = a - bp$$

$$S(P) = c + dp$$

a, b, c, d are market parameters that define the points where the lines intersect with the coordinate axes and lie.

We find the equilibrium price:

$$D(P) = a - bp = c + dp = S(P)$$

$$\text{Answer: } P^* = (a-c) / (d+b)$$

Equilibrium quantity of goods is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} D(P^*) &= a - bp^* = (a - b) \cdot (a - c) / (d + b) = \\ &= (ad + ba - ab + bc) / (d + b) = (ad + bc) / (d + b) \end{aligned}$$

These issues can also be solved with inverse functions:

$$bP_D = a - (D(P) = q) = a - q$$

$$P_D = (a-q) / b$$

Similarly:

$$dP_S = (S(P)=q) = q - s$$

$$P_S = (q-c) / d$$

We find the price of demand equal to the price of supply:

$$(a-q) / b = (q-s) / d$$

$$q^* = (ad + bc) / (b + d)$$

As you can see, the answer is the same in both cases.

It is known that the supply and demand line is affected by a number of factors, and since these are factors that are not price-dependent, their change shifts the supply and demand lines to the right or left.

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